BEIJING, CHINA - OCTOBER 20: Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, left and Chinese President Xi Jinping shakes hands after a signing ceremony on October 20, 2016 in Beijing, China. Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte is on a four-day state visit to China, his first since taking power in late June, with the aim of improving bilaterial relations. (Photo by Ng Han Guan-Pool/Getty Images)
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Rodrigo Duterte, the flamboyant president of the Philippines, has spent this week in Beijing executing a dramatic pivot away from the US, his country’s closest ally, and into the arms of the rising superpower, China.

During his four-day trip, his first to a country outside the Asean bloc since becoming president in June, he said it was time to “say goodbye” to the US and claimed that “only China [could] help” the Philippines. If followed to their logical conclusion, his words would represent the most significant realignment of geopolitical power in the region since the cold war.

In spite of his uncompromising language, Mr Duterte may well in fact be playing the tides between the US and China rather than reversing the Philippines’ fundamental strategic posture. Nonetheless, he should recognise that this is a highly dangerous endeavour, not only for his country but also for the broader region.

Mr Duterte is bashing Washington to ingratiate himself with Beijing, but his rhetoric risks alienating both of the world’s biggest powers. Manila appears to be betting that the US will not abandon one of its closest regional allies just because of the colourful insults Mr Duterte has directed at Barack Obama.

But in referring to the US president as the “son of a whore”, Mr Duterte reveals a worrying lack of finesse that may serve him ill if US-China tension in the region ramps up. In addition, Washington may be less than willing in the future to look past Mr Duterte’s more substantive threats, such as pledging to cancel the joint military exercises that form a key part of the US military presence in the region.

On China’s side of the equation, Mr Duterte is walking an even trickier path. If Manila is hoping for more Chinese trade and investment as a reward for tilting towards Beijing’s strategic position in the disputed South China Sea, this may pay off to some extent in the short term. There is ample evidence of China rewarding regional allies, such as Cambodia, that support it in political disputes.

But Beijing sees the South China Sea as a binary issue; it regards the 41 disputed islands and land features as its own territory and it plans to take all of them back. Thus, emollient words are unlikely to satisfy China for long. Manila risks falling prey to a diplomatic dynamic in which China exacts the surrender of territorial claims as downpayments for investment and trade pledges. Such an outcome could quickly pall, eroding Mr Duterte’s popularity at home and the tough guy image he has burnished through a ruthless domestic crackdown on drugs.

What is more, any territorial concessions by Mr Duterte that run counter to the ruling of an international tribunal this year would undermine the rule of law in the region and potentially embolden Beijing. The tribunal found that China lacked a “legal basis” to multiple claims in the South China Sea.

Mr Duterte is not the only one who needs to engage in careful reflection. Washington too should recognise that it is partly responsible for Manila’s flirtation with China. Mr Obama’s rebalancing towards Asia has been halfhearted, and the US has taken the loyalty of countries such as the Philippines for granted. It needs to show greater commitment to its regional friends.

For Mr Duterte, it is not too late to reverse course on his rash excursion into diplomatic adventurism. He should make it clear to the Americans that he has no intention of abandoning their alliance. Setting the US and China against one another over such an incendiary issue as the South China Sea is foolhardy. The Philippines leader should see this before it is too late.

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