Ukraine series: how long will the war last?

This is an audio transcript of the Rachman Review podcast episode: ‘Ukraine series: how long will the war last?’

Gideon Rachman
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Hello and welcome to the Rachman Review. I’m Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator of the Financial Times. February the 24th will mark a year since Russia invaded Ukraine. With the fighting still raging, we’re devoting this month’s podcast to the war. My guest this week is Hein Goemans, professor at the University of Rochester in the United States. His academic specialism is war termination theory. In other words, how wars end. So what are the prospects for peace in Ukraine?

Hein Goemans
So I study war because it’s terrible, and because it’s truly terrible. I was raised, you know, in the Netherlands and with family members who had fought and who had died in the second world war in the camps and, you know, and elsewhere. It’s gonna take a lot of dying and a lot of death and destruction before both sides say, okay, we kind of, we can anticipate what the war is gonna end like and like, and we’re going to accept that and we’re gonna make a deal on that basis. I mean, I don’t see any clear end to this war.

Gideon Rachman
That was Hein Goemans explaining why he’s interested in war and why he’s gloomy about the prospect that the conflict in Ukraine will end anytime soon. That’s a view shared by many people in the American government. In fact, I was alerted to Professor Goemans’ work by a contact who works in the American government, and he was cited as something that his colleagues had been studying as they tried to see how this war might be brought to a close. Unfortunately, the Ukraine war, as you’ll hear, bears many of the hallmarks of a conflict that’s destined to go on for some time. I began our discussion by asking Hein Goemans to give me an outline of what war termination theory is all about.

Hein Goemans
Let me start with a very basic kind of introduction to the topic. There is a war because both sides ask more than the other’s willing to give. Very simple. So for a war to end, the minimum war aims of at least one side must change. And then the question you’ve got to ask is, what causes those war aims to change? War actually does something that we cannot do in peacetime. It lets you see on the battlefield how strong you really are, how resolved and how strong your opponent is. And in addition, know the attitude and behaviour of potential allies of either side. So one of the basic characteristics of war is that it provides information. So if we both know how the war is gonna end and more or less what the outcome is gonna be, then it makes no sense for us to keep on fighting because we’re just throwing away lives, cost. So we have to come to the stage where both sides more or less know what the outcome is going to be, and we are not there yet. There is an additional stage and after that, certain leaders may not wanna terminate the war because they are afraid that their loss will cost them their lives.

Gideon Rachman
Do you think, however, that or does the war theory tell you that once it becomes more than two parties involved, even if the other parties, you know, are not directly involved, that that makes it less likely or harder to end?

Hein Goemans
I mean, some people are trying to pitch this as, oh, the United States versus Russia, which is a big mistake. This is not a proxy war. The support of the west is crucial, but it is not on behalf of the direct interests of the United States and the west. It is certainly on behalf of the indirect interest of the security architecture of Europe and the whole world. But the people are doing the fighting and the dying, and whose interests are most directly at stake are the Ukrainians. Most wars last five months. Notice the median. 50 per cent of wars last about five months. But there is no smooth drop-off — most of them end relatively quickly. And then some go on for a long time.

Gideon Rachman
Is there a particular reason why, if it goes beyond five months, it’s likely to continue for quite a while yet?

Hein Goemans
Well, some people would say yes, because it makes clear that this is a war caused by a commitment problem that no peace deal will stick. But more generally it’s because the underlying dynamic is different from the short war. So let me give you a very simple kind of example. First world war. Everybody in Britain knows that it started in 1914 and ended in 1918. Unfortunately, not all my undergrads do. But one of the interesting things is that in November 1914, there was a Crown Council in Germany with the chancellor, with the Kaiser, William the Last, as I like to refer to him, and the chief of staff where they all agreed they can’t win. Now they keep fighting. What happened there is that they had the Schlieffen Plan. This brilliant plan was supposedly designed to win the war quickly. It failed and therefore they should have ended the war. Something very different about the first world war, in that very Crown Council, these leaders already recognised that in case of failure there would be a domestic revolution and they could not tolerate that possibility and therefore kept fighting. So here’s an example of why a war should end quickly, but sometimes doesn’t.

Gideon Rachman
I mean, I think, you know, we talk about the first world war, but when you listen to what Putin says, the war that preoccupies him is the second world war. And it probably preoccupies a lot of Europeans. And we know how that one ended. That ended with a total defeat of Germany. But is one of the complications here that in the nuclear age, that’s just not possible. Total defeat is not going to happen to Russia.

Hein Goemans
Yeah, that’s interesting. The thing that is striking is that there is a cap on Ukrainian aims. They will not go beyond the borders of 1991. So there is no incentive or there’s no even belief or need or just there would be no sanity in the idea of decisively defeating Russia inside Russia. You have to defeat decisively the Russians in Ukraine to push them back. Whereas this is not the case for the Russians. Their war aims are unlimited. They want to take over entire Ukraine and perhaps even, being realistic about this, subsequently in Moldova and other parts of the former Russian empire, whether we’d be the Czarist or the Communist one.

Gideon Rachman
But one of the things one hears at the moment is a sort of pushback against the idea that this war is gonna go on and on and on and on is at least the Ukrainians say, look, we need Ukrainian victory. Lesia Vasylenko, who I interviewed last week, says we’ve got to win by the summer. And they seem to believe that they can win a military victory against Russia. And I mean, just for the sake of argument, say that happens. Does that then not bring the war to an end without this convergence of views of what’s possible and so on?

Hein Goemans
If Russia believes that it can still mobilise and has another trick up its sleeve, it won’t do it. Or they may try very risky strategies, as the Germans did in the first world war. I think there is a chance that Ukrainians will push forward during the spring if they have integrated the tanks, but they may have to wait until they get the planes. If they get the plane to do the combined arms warfare at which Nato excels and which the Russians simply can’t do and which is a massive force multiplier. It may take a little bit longer, but it takes two sides to end the war. It’s a fundamental point. And the question is why would Russia, why would Putin ever agree? I mean, in my opinion, if he gives up Crimea, it will cost him his personal safety, you know, maybe his life, and he may be thrown in jail. It’s too much of a sacrifice. He can’t sell that to the people. So he’s not gonna do it.

Gideon Rachman
I suppose what the Ukrainians would respond is that may not be within his choice. He may just lose on the battlefield.

Hein Goemans
Well, the Germans quote unquote, “lost” on the battlefield and they kept fighting another four years. And at some moments they came very close to winning, right? So it’s a somewhat naive perspective because I think that Russia has plenty of hardware and mobilisation potential to keep fighting for a long time. You know, every war has its ups and downs. The question is, do the Russians think that they still have a chance to score the necessary victory? So, I mean, if they push back the Russians all the way to the 1991 borders, the Ukrainians are gonna say, “We’re willing to settle,” and it would be genuine. I don’t see why the Russians would ever accept it, to repeat myself. I mean, Putin may be removed, but then there will be a more hawkish leader who’ll replace him. The Russians are not stupid. I mean, they are willing and Putin is certainly not stupid either. He’s listening to new information and he is updating. But he says basically if this doesn’t work, try something else. I mean, there’s rumour now that he’s trying to force the Russians to have another go in Kyiv and the military is saying we can’t do that and we don’t wanna do it but Putin is insisting he is just trying different strategies. He knows some things don’t work. This is why Wagner is allowed to do this horrible thing with the prisoners. He knows some things don’t work. He’s not stupid, but he’s trying other things.

Gideon Rachman
So give us some sense of what are these resources that the Russians can mobilise? Because early in the war there were opportunistic noises. Admittedly, they hadn’t yet fully mobilised the population. They still haven’t. That sanctions were hitting their industry, their industrial base, they were running out of ammunition, they were running out of semiconductors — so just explain to me why that’s wrong, that you think the Russians can just keep fighting for a very long time?

Hein Goemans
Well, as you say, they have the manpower base, so they can do a mobilisation. They had something like 15,000 tanks and now 2,000 of them are kind of gone now, but they can patch together another two, 3,000 tanks if they want to. And they get plenty of ammunition from the North Koreans or elsewhere. They can dig in. They can actually, you know, try to recreate trench warfare if they want to. And many countries have fought on in what looked like desperate situations for a long time, because they could motivate the people and because they thought there was some chance of realistic victory, even a very small one. He can be mobilised. He can actually go on total war economy. There are many options. There has to be some notion that he says this is gonna be too costly. I don’t want to do this anymore.

Gideon Rachman
So to put it the other way, what about Ukrainian staying power? I noticed that Robert Gates and Condoleezza Rice argued recently that time is on Russia’s side. What do you make of that argument?

Hein Goemans
So, well, that’s interesting, particularly in the context of your earlier question. What are the reasons why Putin keeps fighting and why he can be hopeful and think that he might pull it off in the long run is because he thinks that the west will crumble. So the more people who say let go, we should negotiate now, the long-term is favourable to Russia, the more Putin can hope that the west will in the end fail to support Ukraine. And if that happens, then Ukraine will lose on the battlefield.

Gideon Rachman
So if the war only ends when the two sides’ aims become compatible, what would it take for that to happen?

Hein Goemans
The aims have to be compatible. The second thing to keep in mind here is that you must believe that any deal you make will stick, so there won’t be drastic changes in the future which will give one side an advantage and they will renege on the deal.

Gideon Rachman
That’s called a credible commitment problem.

Hein Goemans
Correct. Absolutely correct. And this is what everybody is very worried about, given that Putin already invaded in 2014 and then thought he’d do it again. So, what has to happen for the minimum terms of settlement to become compatible, is that both sides need to agree on how the war will end.

Gideon Rachman
And in that case, another thing that you studied is the importance of the domestic regime. And is there something about the Russian domestic regime that makes this a political order that’s particularly unlikely to end the war, even if the war is going badly?

Hein Goemans
Yes, I do think so. I mean, an interesting thing about the regime is, of course, that Putin is the linchpin. It might be hard to replace him. And that’s exactly why he designed a system like that, right? So that he would be irreplaceable because he keeps the factions together and the flow of money to the right people. So he’s the linchpin of the regime and the question is, does Putin have the repressive apparatus of a Saddam Hussein who basically killed the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south when he lost the Gulf War? Or is he kind of a regime that cannot fully repress any domestic opposition? There is debate among academics on that. I am still of the belief that while he’s pretty repressive and he’s switching more to a totalitarian state, he’s not there yet and he’s really literally at risk. His life is literally at risk.

Gideon Rachman
So he is particularly unwilling to settle in the way that maybe somebody in a democratic system where their lives might not be at risk might settle.

Hein Goemans
That’s exactly right.

Gideon Rachman
How do you assess the incentives of the Ukrainians? I mean, I suppose we hear from them and it’s difficult to dispute it, that they have no incentive to settle because they feel they’re fighting for their freedom and for their statehood.

Hein Goemans
I think that’s correct. I think that if Zelenskyy made a deal which gave up, you know, the four annexed areas. I think he might also be removed from office, but he’s not gonna be killed, because he is a war hero and he has a lot of credit and it’s very different. He’s clearly not the one who is culpable. He’s not the one who’s responsible for this war. Ukrainians also make a calculation it’s just worth the cost. And the Russians are trying to influence that calculation. The Russians are trying to teach the Ukrainians that the war is gonna be very costly by taking out their infrastructure and just punishing of civilians. And on the other hand is the west, which is telling the Russians this war is gonna be too costly because we have sanctions on you and your complete economy will implode. So this teaching is going on at both sides. But back to the Ukrainians, there’s many other kind of examples where states have tried to punish the civilians in the hope to break their will. And in almost all cases, it’s had the opposite effect. The will of the people are getting bombed is hardened.

Gideon Rachman
So Russia’s pursuing a counterproductive strategy.

Hein Goemans
Somewhat, yeah. But you know, so many countries have been doing this. It’s kind of really striking. This is an example that you see occurring over and over again. I think that the Ukrainians are highly motivated and therefore are willing to tolerate very high costs. I mean, the Kremlin has a very effective propaganda apparatus and is successful in inculcating some belief among the ordinary Russians that this is a just war, and thereby driving up the willingness of the Russian people to suffer costs. In the end, I think that the Russians are not willing to suffer as many costs as the Ukrainians are.

Gideon Rachman
Obviously, Ukraine is not fighting alone. They’re fighting with backing from the United States, from the European Union and so on. The UK as well. But talking to the Americans, at least, they’ve been very preoccupied from the beginning by this threat of nuclear escalation. From a kind of theoretical point of view, what does theory tell you about the risk of nuclear escalation?

Hein Goemans
It seems to me that Putin might have tried it early on the war, but he can’t do it anymore. I mean, I can tell you one very specific instance in which you might wanna do it. First of all, it’s not gonna be very effective on the battlefield. You’re not gonna get the mass forces in one place that you can isolate it. You can’t kill just Ukrainians and no Russians and therefore swing the tide on the battlefield. Not gonna be particularly useful. If he uses a nuke against a civilian target, I mean, the whole world is gonna be against them, you know. And that may take longer to fight, but the whole world will mobilise against him, support the Ukrainians, and there’s no way he’s gonna win. The only way I can see Putin use nuclear weapons goes back to this story that I told earlier about the western allies and particularly the people in Germany, who are very, very skittish about nuclear weapons. You know, if I were Putin and I thought that my life was at stake and it looks like I can’t get the victory I need in order to stay in office and survive, I might use a test nuclear weapon or a test nuclear explosion to see if my nukes really still work and just scare the heck out of the Germans and everybody in Europe, who are then supposedly going to pressure the Ukrainians to lower their demands and settle on terms which are acceptable for Putin. So that’s the only strategy that I can see Putin really using nuclear weapons.

Gideon Rachman
Okay. So this brings us to another pressure point. I mean, you’ve explained why the Russians aren’t gonna give up, why the Ukrainians aren’t gonna give up. But if Ukrainians’ ability to keep fighting depends on the west not giving up, what is the risk or possibility of the west losing interest?

Hein Goemans
I’m relatively optimistic about it, but I mean, if Trump wins in 2024, things will change. I think that Great Britain will stand squarely behind Ukraine and as many people in the west. But Germany is still vacillating. It’s really surprising what they are doing. I just really don’t understand the strategy or the plans of Scholz. It makes absolutely no sense what this guy is doing. But if the west decides they’re not gonna support Ukraine fully anymore, then Ukraine is in a really tough spot and they’ll have to dramatically lower aims. There’s no way they’re gonna push back Russia to the 1991 borders and they may have to accept the four annexed areas as part of Russia forever.

Gideon Rachman
So you’re saying that in a sense Russia’s best hope is the re-election of Donald Trump?

Hein Goemans
Well, Russia’s best hope is breaking up the western support for Ukraine, and that can happen in a variety of ways, right? I just told you a story about the nuclear demonstration of just testing a bomb and then scaring the west, Trump getting elected. I mean, that really surprises me. I just read another article in the New York Times about these people who are saying like, “Oh, Ukraine should negotiate and should make some kind of peace deal,” but these people are idiots. I mean, idiots! Do they think that Putin, after he has been successful and shown that he’s been a great leader, and he won against the mighty Nato alliance and all this force, that he’s gonna stop? He’s not gonna come back? What are they drinking or what are they smoking? How can you possibly believe that is true, particularly if he demonstrates that he can stand up to Nato and the west? How can you think this guy won’t come back and ask for more? We know appeasement, right? We know appeasement doesn’t work.

Gideon Rachman
If you had to predict based on theory and how that applies to what you’re seeing unfold before you, how and when it would end, nobody can be sure, obviously. But if you had to look at the situation now, tell me how and when you think this war is gonna end. What would your bet be on?

Hein Goemans
Going back to the analogy of the first world war one more time, what really changed attitudes in Germany was the collapse of Bulgaria and Austro-Hungary suing for peace. Then, only then did the German people find out that the war was lost because Ludendorff had set up a Ministry of Information saying, “We’re gonna win, we’re doing great. We’re gonna win, we’re going to win.” And finally, reality and truth hit him smack in the face that they couldn’t win and they wouldn’t win. And then, of course, they started the revolution. What it will take is for the Russians to realise, for the Russian people, that they can’t win this war. This can happen in a variety of ways. There can be a revolt against Putin, which we think is unlikely. There can be secessionist movements in the administrative units in Russia, or it can be a long kind of peaceful stalemate or ceasefire along the 1991 border where there’s occasionally shots fired, but no dramatic incursions and no dramatic battles. It’s heartbreaking to say, but it’s just bleak, Gideon. Hundreds of thousands of people are gonna die and for really no good reason. I mean, there is a deal available, but Russia can’t take it. And the question you gotta ask yourself is why that is. And the answer I’m going back to is twofold. Domestic politics and they still have plans and ideas and you know, they think they can teach Ukrainians some new information or hope that the west will fall apart.

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Gideon Rachman
That was Hein Goemans of Rochester University ending this edition of the Rachman Review. Thanks for listening and please join me again next week.

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