European ombudsman: Qatargate exposed a weak ethical culture — this must change

The writer is the European ombudsman

Every scandal here in Brussels spurs a move towards new rules. It’s rare that anything that restricts the activities of commissioners after they leave office or puts a leash around what MEPs like to call “the freedom of the mandate” is enacted without one.

The European parliament first adopted a code of conduct for MEPs in 2012 after a “cash-for-amendments” scandal. The European Commission strengthened its revolving door regulations following the former commission president José Manuel Barroso’s move to Goldman Sachs in 2016.

Now, in the wake of Qatargate — a corruption scandal in which MEPs are alleged to have accepted cash in exchange for their support — EU institutions are struggling once again to jump-start their ethical momentum.

Another wave of reforms is under discussion — specifically, a new “inter-institutional ethics body” proposed on Thursday by the commission’s vice-president Věra Jourová. Should this merit applause or scepticism? 

Those in favour recognise, correctly, that there is for the first time high-level support for a permanent forum in which EU institutions can discuss ethical standards and be held to account. Peer pressure may be a powerful tool for raising standards and the hope is that this body will boost performance. Regular self-assessments, published by the body, may help keep participants’ feet to the fire.

However, this proposal is not a response to the deficiencies and vulnerabilities exposed by Qatargate. It is not the sort of star chamber that some would have wished for, one with the power to investigate and impose sanctions on individuals. “No legal basis” is the claim of the commission. “No across-the-board political will” is probably a more accurate take.

As Qatargate awaits its denouement, the same questions continue to be asked. Why was it left to member state intelligence services and the Belgian authorities to detect and investigate these alleged violations? Why was the enforcement of existing rules so limp, such as the requirement for organisations participating in parliament events to be on the transparency register? Why did no one inside the institution raise the alarm about bad, arguably criminal, behaviour that may go back years and involve multiple actors?

Answers to the ethical quandaries of these institutions will not be handed down from on high. The hard work of rooting out bad actors and breeding a culture of honest ethical reflection will continue to rest at the door of each separate institution.

Self-regulation must be abandoned or significantly reformed. The membership of the parliament’s code of conduct advisory committee, for example, should be expanded to include independent experts such as former judges. This would decrease the risk of the committee being politicised, especially if given powers to initiate investigations and decide on sanctions — the key elements that make any such body credible in the eyes of the public.  

It would also relieve the parliament’s president of her unenviable, and arguably unworkable, responsibility for making final judgments on complex matters of conflicts of interest and corresponding sanctions.  

The proposed introduction of the new inter-institutional body should not, however, distract from the fact that oversight bodies with significant powers already exist, including the EU’s anti-fraud office — Olaf — and my own office of European Ombudsman, which regularly investigates claims of unethical behaviour (though not of MEPs). 

All institutions need to reflect on how they respond to the decisions and recommendations of these bodies as part of their commitment to improving the overall culture of accountability.

For example, there has long been a stand-off between Olaf and the parliament vis-à-vis its right to investigate MEPs in the same way it would investigate those in every other EU institution. Similarly, following the Barroso case, a recommendation by my office to give the European Commission’s internal ethics committee powers to initiate investigations was rejected.

Culture ultimately determines everything. A weak new body will be gobbled up by a weak ethical culture. Changing that culture is the challenge for those who lead these institutions, politically and administratively.

In my experience as ombudsman, the strongest and best administrations are those not with the longest laminated list of rules, but those whose culture of integrity is so firmly entrenched that they barely need any at all.